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ABSTRACT
Software Architecture Risk Assessment
Ajith Reddy Guedem
Risk assessment is an essential part of the software development life cycle. Performing
risk analysis early in the life cycle enhances resource allocation decisions, enables us to compare
alternative software architectural designs and helps in identifying high-risk components in the
system. As a result, remedial actions to control and optimize the process and improve the quality
of the software product can be taken. In this thesis we investigate two types of risk - reliability-
based and performance-based risk. The reliability-based risk assessment takes into account the
probability of the failures and the severity of failures. For the reliability-based risk analysis we
use UML models of the software system, available early in the life cycle to come up with the
risk factors of the scenarios and use cases. For each scenario we construct a Markov model
to assess the risk factors of the scenarios and its risk distribution among the various classes of
severity. Then we investigate both independent use cases and use cases with relationships, while
obtaining the system-level risk factors. For use cases that include relationships we developed an
algorithm that scans the entire use case diagram and aggregates the risk factors accordingly to
obtain a system-level risk factor. For the performance-based risk analysis we use UML diagrams
with performance related annotations, build a software execution model for each scenario and
then map it to a system execution model using the deployment information. For estimating
the performance-based failures of each scenario we use an asymptotic bounding analysis. The
reliability-based and performance-based risk assessment methodologies are applied on various
case studies.
Keywords - software architecture, reliability-based risk, Markov chain, use case relation-
ships, performance-based risk, software execution model, system execution model, asymptotic
bounding analysis
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Risk assessment provides useful means for identifying potentially troublesome software compo-
nents that require careful development and allocation of more testing efforts. Risk assessment
can be performed at various phases throughout the development process. Architecture models,
abstract design, and implementation details describe systems using compositions of components
and connectors. A component can be as simple as an object, a class, or a procedure, and as
elaborate as a package of classes or procedures. Connectors can be as simple as procedure calls;
they can also be as elaborate as client-server protocols, links between distributed databases, or
middleware. Of course, risk assessment at the architectural level early in the life cycle is more
beneficial than assessment at later development phases for several reasons. This kind of analysis
highlights major architectural flaws in terms of design and identifies critical system components.
Moreover risk-analysis can be applied to alternative architectures proposed early in the software
life cycle and help developers choose the less risky software architecture for further design and
implementation. It is well known that early detection and correction of problems is significantly
less costly than detection and correction at the code level or in the later stages of life cycle.
Next, we discuss the related work on risk analysis and the major contributions of this
1
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thesis.
1.1 Related work
This thesis presents software architectural risk analysis in terms of software reliability and per-
formance, based on UML specifications. Software risk assessment is different from other domains
and is very challenging in the sense that many parameters need to quantified and defined. The
main objective of risk analysis presented in this thesis is in the lines of identifying critical com-
ponents on grounds of reliability and performance. Recent evidence suggests that most faults are
found in only a few of a systems components [11]. If these components can be identified early,
then mitigating actions can be taken, such as, focusing the testing on high-risk components by
optimally allocating testing resources [18], or redesigning components that are likely to cause
failures or to be costly to maintain. Several other reliability and risk quantification ideas have
been presented in [41] and [14] and [40].
We also needed to define a system model on an architectural level. A number of analytical
models proposed to address software reliability are presented in [14]. According to [46] many
existing software reliability models can be classified according to classification of the software
systems and their maturity. For example the classification proposed in [34] is based on software
life cycle such as debugging phase, validation phase or operational phase. The reliability model
presented in this thesis is based on the model presented in [3]. This model considers a program
flow graph of a terminating application to have a single entry and single exit and the transfer
of control from component to component is described as an absorbing discrete time Markov
chain(DTMC).
The reliability-based risk model presented in chapters 3 of this thesis, generalizes the
software reliability model presented in [3]. First of all the models presented in our methodology
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are based on UML diagrams mainly the sequence diagrams which have dynamic software behavior
embedded, use case diagrams, which specify the relationships between the various use cases etc.
Second instead of assuming a single exit nodes or terminating states of the software model [3],
we introduce the concept of multiple failure nodes. Risk is quantified as probability of a failure
times its consequence(severity/impact) of that failure. The advantage of having multiple failure
nodes and mapping them with severity of failures provides a whole new dimension to the risk
factor - instead of a single number risk factor is presented as a distribution among the failure
severity classes. Finally the methodology presented in this thesis(chapter 3) also considers the
failures of the both connectors and components rather than only component failures. This is
important because the connector failures contribute and important amount of risk towards the
total system risk factor.
Yacoub and Ammar [41] combine severity and complexity factors to develop heuristic
risk factors for the components and connectors. Based on scenarios, they developed component
dependency graph that represents components, connectors, and probabilities of component in-
teractions. The overall system risk factor as a function of the risk factors of its constituting
components and connectors is obtained using an aggregation algorithm. The reliability-based
risk assessment present in chapter 3 is a lightweight methodology to perform analytical risk as-
sessment at the architectural level based on the analysis of behavioral UML specifications, mainly
use cases and sequence diagrams. This risk assessment approach is entirely analytical, in contrast
with the previous works [1] and [41], which was based on simulations of execution profiles. The
main advantages of the this analytical solution is is that sensitivity analysis can be performed
simply by plugging different values of the parameters in the closed form solutions, which is faster
and more effective than reapplying the algorithmic solutions for each set of different parameters
as in [1]. Another advantage is that the development of a tool for automatic risk assessment is
straightforward. We have already developed a prototype of a tool for risk assessment [44] based
on the methodology presented in this paper. The tool uses Rational Rose Real Time [35] as a
front end.
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In risk assessment it is important to identify the components that are more prone to
faults, which may manifest into failures over a period of time. Since risk analysis presented
here is at an architectural-level we are interested in mapping the complexity of the component
to its fault proneness. Predictive models exist that incorporate a relationship between program
error measures and software complexity metrics [22]. Software complexity measures were also
used for developing and executing test suites [19]. Therefore, static complexity is used to assess
the quality of a software product. The level of exposure of a component is a function of its
execution environment. Hence, dynamic complexity [23] evolved as a measure of complexity of
the subset of code that is actually executed. Dynamic complexity used for reliability assessment
purposes was discussed in [24]. Ammar et al. extended dynamic complexity definitions to
incorporate concurrency complexity [1]. In addition, they used Colored Petri Nets models to
measure dynamic complexity of software systems using simulation reports. Yacoub et al. define
dynamic metrics that include dynamic complexity and dynamic coupling to measure the quality
of software architectures [40]. Their approach was based on dynamic execution of UML state
chart specification of a component and the proposed metrics were based on simulation reports.
Severity is another factor constituting the risk factor. The complexity of the component
and the connectors attribute to the fault proneness or the probability of failure while sever-
ity attributes to the adversity or the consequence of those failure.A comparison of the various
methodologies has been presented in [16] and a framework for estimating the severity of failure
is presented in [17]. The framework combines the use of three suitable methods - Function Fail-
ure Analysis(FFA), Failure Mode and Effect Analysis(FMEA) and Fault Tree Analysis(FTA), to
come up with the severity values of the components and connectors.
It is also important to consider the various relationships between the use cases are to be
considered while aggregating the risk factors to compute system-level risk factor. [45] presents
the various relationships between the use cases and a algorithm which automated the process of
scanning the use case diagram and risk aggregations.
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The second kind of risk studied in this thesis is the performance-based risk. Performance-
based analysis measures risk in terms of the non-functional performance attributes of the system
and is also conducted architectural level defined by UML diagrams. Several approaches have be
presented, in the last few years, aimed at embedding performance(as well as other non-functional
properties) information in UML software models using the UML extensions [42], [32].In work
presented in [26] and [27] an extension of the UML notation to performance annotations (pa-
UML) has been proposed to embed performance related information in UML. A framework that
allows UML diagrams to be used for building performance models is presented in [20].
A different type of performance annotation on UML diagrams is carried out in [13]; the
component interconnection patterns of client/server systems are investigated(to derive perfor-
mance information) by use of UML class diagrams and collaboration diagrams. Dimitrov et.al
[8] presents various kinds of UML extensions that are used to annotate and embed performance
aspects various UML diagrams. A UML-driven framework is presented and several interesting
and useful approaches of direct and expanded extensions to UML are presented such as; load-
and-time weighted use case diagrams, sequence and activity diagrams with time information,
state diagrams with transition probability and most importantly deployment diagrams (which
map the various software components to the system hardware platform). Smith [36], [37] present
the conversion of a various parameterizations of the execution graph with demand vectors, to
convert it into a Execution Graph(EG). This is called the Software Execution Model [36]. A
more extensive approach has been introduced in [7], where also asynchronous communication
patterns and concurrent action executions have been considered.
The performance-based risk analysis presented in [5] defines the performance failure on
a scenario level and quantifies risk as a combination of the probability failure and the severity
of the failure. An asymptotic bounding analysis to come up with the asymptotic bounds on
throughput and response time of a scenario(modelled by a software execution graph) bounding
analysis is presented in [25]. This bounding analysis is light weight and gives is applicable to
both open and closed queuing networks. The g
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1.2 Contributions
The contributions of this thesis are summarized as follows [15]:
• The main contribution of this thesis to the methodology presented in [15] is the risk
model(presented in section 3.5.2). The risk methodology presented in [15], is a light-weight
methodology to perform reliability-based risk assessment at architectural level based on
the analysis of UML specifications(mainly the use case and the sequence diagrams). We
develop a Markov model to determine scenarios risk factors using components and con-
nector risk factors. This model provides exact closed form solutions for the scenario risk
factors. An additional advantage of the derived closed form solutions is that it provides
an effective way for conducting sensitivity analysis. Thus, we simply plug different values
of the parameters in the closed form solutions. Using scenario risk factors, we also derive
the risk factor of each use case and the overall system risk factor. Moreover the analytical
solution also helps in the automation of the risk assessment process, and the prototype of
the tool that used to automate this process is presented in [44].
The Markov model used for estimating the scenarios risk factors generalizes the existing
architecture-based software reliability models in two ways. Thus, while the software re-
liability model presented in [3] considers only component failures, in the scenarios risk
models, we account for both components and connectors failures, that is, we consider both
components and connectors risk factors. Further, instead of a single failure state consid-
ered in all existing architecture-based software reliability models [14], we consider multiple
failure states that represent failure modes with different severities. This approach allows
us to derive the distribution of scenarios/use cases/system risk factors over different sever-
ity classes, which provide additional insights that are important for risk analysis. Thus,
scenarios and use cases that have risk factors distributed among more severe classes will
be more critical and deserve more attention than other scenarios and use cases. We apply
domain knowledge to a frame work presented in the paper [17], to come up with severity
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values of the components and connectors.
• In the paper [45], an extension to the risk assessment methodology presented in the chapter
[15]is presented. The original risk-assessment methodology presented in [15] considers
only independent use cases. The methodology presented in the paper [45] relaxes this
assumptions of independent use cases(considering all the use cases are primitive).
The main contribution of this thesis towards the methodology presented in [45] is the risk
aggregation algorithm presented in section 4.1.4 that aggregates the risk factors of the
primitive use cases into the non-primitive use cases based on the relationships. To deal
with these relationships for complex systems with number of use cases, we present a general
algorithm that scans the entire use case diagram, considering it as an undirected tree and
come up with the risk factors of the non-primitive use cases by accounting for the primitive
use cases that are directly related to those non-primitive use cases. The algorithm works
in two passes. The first pass basically is a modified depth-first search tree traversal where,
various kinds of use cases are differentiated and the risk factors of the primitive use cases are
calculated. In the second pass the risk factors of the non-primitive use cases are calculated
by aggregating the risk factors of the primitive use cases related to that use case. Finally
the system-level risk factor is calculated by considering the execution probabilities of all
the terminal use cases.
• In the paper [5], a methodology to calculate the performance-based risk factors is presented.
A mathematical formulation of performance-based risk, as a combination of probability to
violate a performance requirement and the severity of violation consequences is given.
The main contribution of this thesis towards the methodology presented in [5], is the
applying the asymptotic bounding analysis(presented in [25]), to come up with the bounds
on response times of the scenario executions. We calculate the risk factors of the scenarios
based in these bounds on the response time and workload value suitable to that scenario.
We also calculate the service times of the components of the system across the various
scenarios to identify the performance-critical components in the system.
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1.3 Thesis Outline
The thesis is organized as follows. The current chapter presents introduction and related work.
Chapter 2 presents the overview of architectural-level risk analysis, the importance and advan-
tages of UML. Chapter 3 deals with reliability-based risk analysis, the proposed risk method-
ology, quantification of component/connector risk factors, overview of building/solving discrete
time Markov chains(DTMC) and coming up with the various risk factors. The methodology is
illustrated on the pacemaker case study(presented in 3.7). Chapter 4 deals with risk analysis
with use case relationships. Chapter 5 deals with performance-based risk analysis, especially the
bounding analysis which is the mail contribution of this thesis, and applies it an e-commerce
case study. Finally Chapter 6 presents the conclusions and future work.
Chapter 2
Architectural-Level Risk Analysis using
UML
Risk analysis can be performed at various phases throughout the software development process.
But risk analysis at the architectural level is more beneficial than assessment at later phases
of software life cycle for several reasons [14] [15]. Early detection and correction of problems is
significantly less costly than at the code level. Architectural-level risk analysis provides an early
means to identify the potentially troublesome components in software architecture. The outcomes
of such analysis helps us early in the life cycle to assess the strengths and weaknesses of proposed
software architectures. Moreover this also gives us a fair knowledge of the testing efforts that
need to be allocated to the various components. According to the NASA-STD-8719.13A standard
[30], risk is a function of the anticipated frequency of occurrence of an undesired event, the
potential severity of resulting consequences and the uncertainties associated with the frequency
and severity. This standard defines several types of risk such as, availability risk, acceptance
risk, performance risk, cost risk, schedule risk, etc.
This thesis mainly presents our study on two types risks - reliability-based risk and
9
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performance-based risk. The reliability-based risk takes into account the probability that the
software product will fail in the operational environment and the adversity of that failure. We
define risk as a combination of two factors [31]: probability of a malfunction(failure) and the
consequence of that malfunction(severity). Probability of failure depends on the probability of
occurrence of a fault combined with the likelihood of exercising that fault in a scenario(in which
a failure will be triggered). During the early phases of the life cycle it is difficult to come up
with the estimates of the probability of failure of components, hence we use quantitative factors
such as complexity(for components) and coupling(for connectors) which have major impact on
fault proneness according to [10]. We use dynamic metrics to come up with the probability of
fault manifesting into a failure. Dynamic metrics are used to measure the dynamic behavior of
the system in a given scenario based on the premise that the active components/connectors are
the source of failures [40]. To determine the consequence of a failure(i.e., severity), we apply the
MIL STD 1629A Failure Mode and Effect Analysis as discussed later. Chapter 3 deals in detail
with the reliability-based risk analysis. This study is based on previous work [1] and [41]. The
process of risk analysis is not simple when we take into account the various relationships between
the use cases. There are several relationships between the use cases and the risk aggregations
process along the hierarchy the use cases is being presented in chapter 4.
The performance-based risk takes into account the probability that a software product will
fail to meet its performance requirements (such as response time, throughput) in an operational
environment (under some workload) and the adversity of that failure. We use several UML ex-
tensions to represent the performance attributes of the system such as annotated UML sequence
diagrams, deployment diagrams and extract that information to build a system-execution model.
After that a stand-alone analysis for single user workload and a contention-based analysis for a
range of workloads is presented. A system execution model is built and an asymptotic bound-
ing analysis is applied to determine the upper and lower bounds on the scenario throughput
and response time for various workloads. The performance-risk factors are then calculated for
workloads suitable to that scenario.
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2.1 Importance and role of UML
The Unified Modelling Language(UML) [42], [43] is a widely accepted standard notation for
modelling software systems and its use is continuously growing. The software development in-
dustry is embracing UML language for its various uses, starting from requirement analysis, to
define software system architecture and also in the subsequent phases of software life cycle. Uni-
fied Modelling Language(UML) is the result of the unification process of earlier object oriented
models and notations. The success of UML mostly relies on few elementary characteristics:
different diagrams are provided(in an integrated framework) to represent the software model
from different viewpoints; the language is supported by a graphical representation(easy to use),
that is not far from the classical diagrams used before introducing UML(e.g., state diagrams,
class diagrams, sequence diagrams); and no standard software development process is coupled
to the notation, thus software designers may decide to use whatever subset of diagrams fit their
application requirements and organize an application oriented software process.
Verification and validation tasks(V&V), applied to UML specifications, enable early de-
tection of analysis and design flaws prior to implementation. V&V analysis can be categorized
as static or dynamic. Static analysis helps V&V teams in reviewing the structure of UML mod-
els and generating metrics such as class size, the size of the hierarchy and static complexity
measures. The complex dynamic behavior of many applications, especially real-time applica-
tions, motivates a shift in interest from traditional static analysis to dynamic analysis. Dynamic
analysis is performed to analyze the behavior of objects as expected at run time.
The work presented in this thesis is mainly based on analysis done on system architec-
ture defined through dynamic UML specifications. Risk assessment based on software-reliability
presented in this thesis considers various UML diagrams. First, UML state charts are used for
quantifying the fault proneness of the components, by estimating the components complexity;
UML sequence diagrams for quantifying the failure probability of the connectors. Since the se-
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quence diagrams inherently possess dynamic software behavior, they are also used to build the
risk model based. Annotated UML use case diagrams contain information between the various
use cases and they are used in the system-level risk aggregations.
Moreover UML has several extensions defined for defining various aspects of a software
system. There have been a number of such extensions proposed to embed performance(as well
as other non-functional attributes) parameters in UML models, most of which are discussed in
the related work section 1.1. Annotated sequence diagrams are used in performance-based risk
analysis(presented in chapter 5) to come up with completion times of the scenarios and to build
a software execution model. Annotated deployment diagrams are used to identify the various
characteristics of the hardware platform on which the software system runs and are used to map
the software execution model to the system execution model. Although there needs to be more
standardization of UML when it comes to some aspects of software, on the whole UML serves
as an excellent tool for modelling large and complex software systems.
In the next chapter we present the reliability-based risk analysis in detail.
Chapter 3
Reliability-Based Risk Analysis
The reliability-based risk analysis identifies the potential risks in the software architecture, based
on the early system specifications. The architectural specifications are the UML models that are
available early in the software life cycle. The basis for the risk assessment methodology is
the use case diagrams and the scenario diagrams of the system UML model. In this chapter we
present a risk assessment methodology at the architectural level. Our methodology uses dynamic
complexity and dynamic coupling metrics that are obtained from the UML specifications.
The risk-assessment methodology presented in this chapter considers both component
and connector risk factors. We combine severity and complexity(and coupling) metrics to obtain
risk factors for the components(and connectors). We combine the complexity/coupling with the
severity associated with those components/connectors. A framework for estimating the severity of
the is presented in our previous work [17]. Then, we develop a Markov model to estimate scenarios
risk factors from the risk factors of components and connectors, by building a risk model with
multiple failure states, each belonging to a severity class. Further, use cases and overall system
risk factors are estimated using the scenarios risk factors. The methodology is entirely analytical
which allows the automation of the process. In fact we have developed and demonstrated a
13
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prototype of the tool(for details refer [44]. Since the solution resulting from the methodology
is a closed form solution, it allows us to conduct sensitivity analysis(presented in 3.8) of the
system risk factors by plugging in the different risk factor values for the component/connectors.
The main contributions of this thesis towards the reliability-based risk analysis are building the
Markov or the risk model, obtaining the risk factors of the scenarios/ use cases and identification
of critical components. Other steps of the methodology have been presented here for the sake of
completeness.
3.1 Overview of the proposed methodology
The methodology is a top down approach and is iterative over each level of the software archi-
tecture, starting from use case level, to scenario level and down to basic component/connector
level. The process starts from a use case level, iterates through the each use case and each
scenario of that use case. From a scenario level, each component and connector is analyzed and
the corresponding risk factors are estimated. The component risk factor is the product of the
dynamic complexity and the severity of the failure of that component, while the connector risk
factor is the product of the dynamic coupling of the connector and the severity of the failure of
that connector.
The risk analysis presented here is done at an architectural-level. Software architecture is
defined in terms of components(states) and connectors(arcs). The components are mapped to the
various components of the UML sequence diagrams and the connectors can be perceived as the
medium through which the message(or control) transfer takes place. The dynamic complexity
of a component is based on the state chart of that component, which comprises of the number
of states of the component. Similarly, the dynamic coupling of a connector is based on the
number of messages that are carried by the connector i.e. the number of messages passed from
a component A to component B via the connector A-B. Severity of the component/connector is
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based on classifying the impact of failure of that component/connector into four severity classes:
minor, major, critical and catastrophic. This classification is based on domain knowledge applied
to detailed Failure Function analysis(FFA), Failure Mode and Effect Analysis(FMEA) and Fault
Tree Analysis(FTA) [17].
The scenario risk factors take into account the failure states of the components and the
connectors. We build a control flow graph from the sequence diagram. The sequence diagram
shows the normal transfer of the control from component to component. We have the absorb-
ing states in the Markov chain divided into two categories: first the normal termination state
called state(T), second the category of the failure states (minor, major, critical and catastrophic).
Based on the component/connectors severity we decide the failure transition from that compo-
nent/connector to one of the four failure states. The Markov chain is built from the scenario
diagram, starting from start state(S) and then moving onto the states that first take the con-
trol of the scenario and so on. This assumption of single entry state can be easily extended to
multiple entries.
The software reliability model presented in [3] considers only component failures in the
scenarios risk models, but we account for both components and connectors failures, that is, we
consider both components and connectors risk factors. Failure can happen during the execution
period of any component or during the control transfer between the components. It is assumed
that the failure of components and connectors is independent.(Note: this assumption can be
relaxed by considering higher order Markov chains). Further, instead of a single failure state
considered in all existing architecture-based software reliability models presented in [14], we
consider multiple failure states that represent failure modes with different severities.
The steps we follows for the risk analysis process is presented as follows [15]:
1. For each Use case defined for the system
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• For each Scenario defined under that Use case
– For each Component defined in the Scenario
∗ Measure the Dynamic Complexity of the component
∗ Assign severity based on FMEA and Hazard Analysis
∗ Calculate the Component Risk Factor
– For each Connector defined in the Scenario
∗ Measure the Dynamic Coupling of the connector
∗ Assign severity based on FMEA and Hazard Analysis
∗ Calculate the Connector Risk Factor
– Generate critical component/connector list
– Construct Control Flow Graph and Risk model for that scenario - Markov model
for that scenario
– Calculate the Scenario risk factor
• Rank the scenarios based on their risk factor and determine critical scenarios list
• Calculate the Use case risk factors
2. Rank Use cases based on risk factors and determine the critical Use case list
3. Determine the critical component/connector list on a system level
4. Calculate the system risk Factor.
3.2 Component/Connector Risk Factors
This work is based on the previous work [1], [40] and [41], and is presented here for completeness.
Components and connectors are the building blocks of any software architecture. Hence
the architectural risk factor is again dependent on the risk factors of the components/connectors.
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The assessment of component/connector risk factors is based on the dynamic UML specifications
and hence these risk factors are called the dynamic risk factors. The risk factor is a product
of the dynamic complexity/coupling and the severity associated with the failures of these com-
ponents/connectors. Now we need to come up with the risk factors all the components and
connectors in the Scenario Sx defined in each Use case Uk defined in the UML system specifica-
tion.
3.2.1 Components - Dynamic Complexity
The risk factor of a component is defined as the product of the normalized dynamic complexity of
the component and the severity associated with the failure of that component. The normalized
dynamic complexity of a component in a scenario is obtained from the state chart of the com-
ponent corresponding to that scenario. We use the McCabes cyclomatic complexity for coming
up with the dynamic complexity of the component in a scenario based on the corresponding
state chart. After the dynamic complexity of a component is calculated it is normalized against
the sum of the dynamic complexities of all the components in that scenario. The mathematical
expression for the risk factor rfxi of a component i in a scenario Sx is defined as:
rfxi = DOC
x
i ∗ svtxi (3.1)
where 0 ≤ DOCxi ≤ 1 is the normalized dynamic complexity and 0 ≤ svtxi ≤ 1 is the
severity factor associated with that component.
The dynamic complexity of a component in a scenario is based on the state charts of that
component. Let Cxi denote the subset of states and let T
x
i denote the set of transitions for a
component traversed in the state chart of component i in the Scenario Sx. Then the dynamic
complexity of a component i in scenario Si is obtained from the equation 3.2
CHAPTER 3. RELIABILITY-BASED RISK ANALYSIS 18
docxi = t
x
i − cxi + 2 (3.2)
where txi = |T xi | and cxi = |Cxi |(cardinal function of T xi and Cxi ).
The normalized dynamic complexity of a component i denoted as rfxi is obtained by
dividing the normalized complexity of the component i obtained from the state chart by the sum
of the dynamic complexities of all the components in the scenario Sx shown in the equation 3.3.
DOCxi =
docxi∑
k∈Sx doc
x
k
(3.3)
Thus the risk factor of a component takes in account the probability of the failure of the
component(as reflected by the dynamic complexity) and the consequence of the failure of the
component(as reflected by the severity of the component). The procedure for quantifying the
severity of the failure of component is described in section 3.2.3(please refer [17] for details).
3.2.2 Connectors - Dynamic Coupling
The risk factor of a component is defined as the product of the normalized dynamic coupling of
the connector and the severity of the failure of that connector. The mathematical expression for
the risk factor rfxij of the connector from a component i to j in a scenario Sx is defined as
rfxij = EOC
x
ij ∗ svtxij (3.4)
The dynamic coupling of the connector from a component i to a component j is is actually
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the export object coupling from component i to j in a scenario Sx denoted as EOC
x
ij.
Let MT xij denote the set of messages from a component i to a component j during the
execution of a scenario Sx and let MT
x denote the set of messages exchanged between all the
components that are active during the execution of scenario Sx, then EOC
x
ij is the ratio of
number of messages sent from i to j over the total number of messages exchanged in the scenario
Sx as shown in equation 3.5.
EOCxij =
∣∣MT xij∣∣
|MT x| (3.5)
where i, j ∈ Sx and i 6= j. The procedure for coming up with the severity of the failure
of connectors is explained in the section 3.2.3.
3.2.3 Severity Analysis
The dynamic complexity and coupling are estimates of the fault proneness of the components
and connectors, respectively. In addition to this, we also need the consequences of the potential
failures of these components and connectors. Severity plays a prominent role in risk assessment
and hence it is important to know the failure consequence of these components and connectors.
For example, a component can have a low complexity but high severity i.e. its failure results in
catastrophic loses hence it should be projected as risky. According to MIL STD 1629A, severity
considers the worst case consequence of a failure determined by the degree of injury, property
damage, system damage and mission loss that could ultimately occur. Domain experts rank
severity in more than one way depending on the domain of purpose [2]. Based on the analysis
presented in [38] and we identify the following severity classes:
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• Catastorphic: Failure may cause death or total system loss;
• Critical: Failure may cause severe injury, major property damage, major system damage,
or major loss of production;
• Marginal: Failure may cause minor injury, minor property damage, minor system damage,
or delay or minor loss of production;
• Minor: Failure is not serious enough to cause injury, property damage, or system damage,
but will result in unscheduled maintenance or repair.
We assign severity indices of 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, and 0.95 to minor, marginal, critical, and
catastrophic severity classes, respectively. The selection of values for the severity classes on a
linear scale is based on the study presented in our previous work [39]. However, other values
could be assigned to severity classes: for example, using the exponential scale or assuming some
severity distribution (in case there is not data) or using severity-cost relationships. There is also
a framework for severity analysis presented in [17] and [16].
3.3 Overview of the DTMC
The DTMC is short for Discrete Time Markov Chain. A Markov process is defined as a stochastic
process whose behavior is such that probability distribution for its future development depends
only on the present state and is independent of all the previous states. Discrete Time Markov
Chains are a special type of Markov chains where the state space and the time are discrete, not
continuous. In this analysis we are interested in a subset of the DTMC - one with absorbing
states.
The software architecture is modelled by components(states) and connectors(edges/arcs).
The components are mapped to the various components of the UML sequence diagrams and the
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connectors can be perceived as the medium through which the message(or control) transfer takes
place. The DTMC with absorbing states is very well suited for modelling the reliability of software
architectures. Software architecture can be very well presented/understood by program flow
graphs, control flow graphs, component dependency graphs, all of which deal with dynamics of
the software system. Instead of applying the DTMC on a program control graph, which is at a low
level, we apply the methodology on the system level i.e. architectural-level. This level comprises
of components of the system which interact with each other according to a specific control
flow. The UML sequence diagrams are an excellent representation of the various components
of the system and the messages that are passed between these components (representing the
control transfer or control flow). Hence these sequence diagrams can be converted to control flow
graphs(or component dependency graphs). By adding the transition probabilities to the arcs of
the control flow graph we build the DTMC of that sequence diagram. The details of converting
the sequence diagram to a DTMC is presented in section 3.5.
One of the primary assumptions in building a DTMC (for a sequence diagram of a sce-
nario) is that the failure of components/connectors is independent. The arcs or the edges in the
Markov chain represent the transfer of control from one component (state) to another. The edges
are associated with probabilities, which are basically transition probabilities. These transition
probabilities are based on counting the number of messages from component to component, say,
from component A to components B and C.
The terminating states of the control flow graph can be considered as the absorbing states
of the DTMC. All the other states are called transient states. There is a dummy start state(S)
that we add to the control flow graph to model the initial transfer of control from the S to
other states. At the other end, instead of considering one absorbing state we consider several
states. The absorbing states can be categorized into: one normal termination and many abnor-
mal/failure terminations, of the control flow graph. The normal termination state represents the
successful or error-free execution of the control flow graph and is represented by state(T). The
failure termination states represents the failures of components/connectors. The failure states
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are categorized into four classes based on the severity(or impact) associated with the failure of
the component/connector (on the system).
The transition probability matrix P xij for scenario Sx is denoted as P
x
ij = [p
x
ij] where p
x
ij
is defined as the conditional probability from a component i to a component j in a scenario
Sx is defined as the conditional probability that the program control is transferred to the next
component j given that it has just completed the execution in component i i.e pxij = n
x
ij/n
x
i ,
where nxij is the number of times messages have been transmitted from component i to j and
nxi is the total number of messages from component i to all other components in that sequence
diagram.
The transition probability matrix for a scenario Sx is denoted as P
x
ij = [p
x
ij], where p
x
ij
is interpreted as the conditional probability that the program will next execute component j,
given that it has just completed the execution of the component i. The transition probability
from component i to component j in scenario Sx is estimated asp
x
ij = n
x
ij/n
x
i , where n
x
ij is the
number of times messages are transmitted from component i to component j, and nxi =
∑
j n
x
ij
is the total number of messages from component i to all other components that are active in the
sequence diagram of the scenario Sx.
We build a transition probability matrix for each scenario Sx, ∀ components i, j ∈ Sx. The
control flow graph is then associated with transition probabilities for the arcs . This now converts
the control flow graph to a Discrete Time Markov Chain(DTMC). We then adapt a simple, well
known method for calculating the steady state probabilities of the absorbing states (both normal
and failure termination states). We first build a transition probability matrix P with elements pij
representing the probabilities of transition from both transient-transient and transient-absorbing
states si and apply simple mathematical results to obtain the absorbing state probabilities. These
absorbing state probabilities are a direct representation of the failure probabilities (corresponding
to the severity classes) of the scenario. The following section describes in detail an example of a
DTMC and the procedure for calculating the probabilities.
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3.4 Example DTMC with Multiple Absorbing State
An example of the transition probability matrix is given in equation 3.6 for the control flow
graph given in figure 3.1. There is a single start state, s1 and two absorbing states, T and F in
the control flow graph.
P =
s1
s2
s3
s4
T
F
s1 s2 s3 s4 T F
0 0.6 0.4 0 0 0
0 0 0.4 0.3 0 0.3
0 0 0 0.4 0.3 0.3
0 0 0.3 0 0.5 0.2
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1

(3.6)
Figure 3.1 shows a total of six states: the first four states(S1 to S4) are transient and
the last two(T and F ) are absorbing. The transition probability matrix shows the transition
probabilities from both: transient-transient states and transient-absorbing states. The state s1
is the initial or start state and the control then proceeds to the states s2 and s3 with probabilities
0.6 and 0.4 respectively. Each entry pij in P matrix represents the probability of transition from
state si to state sj. An important to thing to note is that the sum of the elements of each row
in the matrix P is equal to 1 i.e.
m∑
i=1
pij = 1 where m is number of columns in P matrix. Since
the states T and F are absorbing states, the entries pTT and pFF are equal to 1 (representing
the loop backs from those states to themselves).
The transition probability matrix P is partitioned into four sub matrices. This illustration
shown in equation 3.7
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Figure 3.1: An Example Control Flow Graph.
P =
 Q C
0 I
 (3.7)
The sub matrix Q shows the transition probabilities from transient to transient states
and the sub matrix C shows the transition probabilities from transient to absorbing state. The
I matrix is an identity matrix with dimension equal to the number of absorbing states in the
DTMC. In the above example the Qand C matrices are given by:
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Q =
s1
s2
s3
s4
s1 s2 s3 s4
0 0.6 0.4 0
0 0 0.4 0.3
0 0 0 0.4
0 0 0.3 0

C =
s1
s2
s3
s4
T F
0 0
0 0.3
0.3 0.3
0.5 0.2
 (3.8)
To generalize the P matrix partitioning, if a given control flow graph(CFG) has a total of
n states then the P matrix is a n x n matrix. If there are m absorbing states in the CFG then
the Q matrix is a square matrix with dimensions (n −m) x (n −m). The C matrix a matrix
with dimensions (n−m) x m according to the partitioning as shown in equation 3.7.
After obtaining the Q and C matrices we calculate the probability of that the control is
transferred to the states T and F given the condition that the start state is S1. In the control flow
graph shown in figure 3.1 the states T and F are absorbing and we are interested in the k-step
transition probability for these states. The k-step transition probability of an absorbing state
is defined as the probability that the DTMC is finally absorbed by that state, assuming that it
starts from a start state S(in the example the start state is s1). This absorbing state probability
can be calculated by the computing the A matrix . The A matrix is defined as A = [aik] where
aik denotes the probability that a DTMC starting from a transient state si is finally absorbed in
the absorbing state sk. This A matrix can be obtained from equation 3.9.
A = (I −Q)−1 ∗ C (3.9)
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where I is and identity matrix with the same dimensions as the Q matrix i.e. (n−m) x
(n−m). Computing the A matrix from the Q and C matrices we have following result.
A = (I −Q)−1 ∗ C =

0.4843 0.5157
0.4284 0.5716
0.5682 0.4318
0.6705 0.3295
 (3.10)
From the expression 3.10 we have the steady state probabilities of the absorbing states
T and F as 0.4843 and 0.5157. These values correspond to the elements a11 and a12 of the A
matrix. It can be observed that the sum of these two values and also sum of all the rows of the
A matrix is equal to 1 i.e.
m∑
j=1
aij = 1 where m is are the number of columns in A matrix.
3.5 Scenario Risk Factors
This section describes how to calculate the risk factors of the scenarios by building the scenario
risk model. The derivation of the DTMC from the UML sequence diagram is the main step in
deriving the k-step transition probability for the absorbing states steady states of the reliability
model (for each sequence diagram). There are some steps involved in deriving and building the
Markov model from the sequence diagram of the various scenarios. First build a control flow
graph from which is a direct translation of the sequence diagram and second build the risk model
for that control flow graph. Sections 3.5.1 and 3.5.2 describe the process of building control flow
graphs and DTMC from the sequence diagrams.
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3.5.1 Building the Control Flow Graph from Sequence Diagram
This section describes the process of building a control flow graph from the sequence diagram.
The difference between the sequence diagram and the control flow graph is that the control flow
graph has a single macro state for a component, while in the sequence diagram we have different
active states of a component represented along the component’s object life time. The convention
we followed is, we named this macro state as the name of the component. Thus the states in a
control flow graph represent the active components(or to be more precise the corresponding active
state of that component, hidden in the representation). The arcs connecting the components(i.e.
connectors) represent a transfer of control between these components.
Figure 3.2 shows a sequence diagram from the AVI scenario of a cardiac pace maker
system(the cardiac pace maker case study is presented in detail in section 3.7). The sequence
diagram consists of three main components - Communications Gnome(CG) which is programmed
by the user to set a particular mode of system operation(in this case AVI mode), Atrial compo-
nent(AR) and Ventricular component(VT)(which sense/pace the heart depending on the mode
of operation). The heart shown the sequence diagram is an external actor which is sensed and
paced by the pace maker system. The states of the AR and the VT components - idle, refracting,
waiting, pacing are shown along the object life lines. Now this sequence diagram is converted to
a control flow graph as described previously.
After obtaining the control flow graph, add the probabilities for control transfers from
a component to another(represented as a number along the corresponding connector). These
probabilities correspond to the transition probabilities of the P x matrix. This gives the Discrete
Time Markov Chain of the software execution behavior for that scenario.
Figure 3.3 shows the DTMC built for the AVI scenario shown in figure 3.2. It has a
single entry state(state S) which is the dummy start state. An assumption here is that the
control transfer between any of the states has the Markov property: given the knowledge of
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Figure 3.2: A sequence diagram in the cardiac pacemaker system.
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Figure 3.3: DTMC for the software execution behavior of the AVI scenario.
the component in control at any given time the future behavior of the system(or in other words
the next transition) is conditionally independent of the past behavior. We now assign the basic
transition probabilities of the control transfer from component to component which is denoted
by the P x for the scenario Sx. The matrix 3.11 shows the transition probability matrix P
AV I for
the AVI scenario.
PAV I =
S
CG
AR
V T
T
S CG AR V T T
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0.5 0.5 0
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0.5 0 0.5
0 0 0 0 1

(3.11)
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3.5.2 Building the Risk Model
This section deals with the second step of building the risk model for the scenario. Instead
of a single failure state considered in all existing architecture-based software reliability models
presented in [14], we consider multiple failure states that represent failure modes with different
severities. Since severity plays an important role in risk assessment, we added m failure states
corresponding to the m failure modes with different severity. From our severity analysis we
came up with four classes of severity. Thus we have n + 1 transient states(n components and
the dummy start state S)and have five absorbing states(i.e. four failure states and one normal
terminating state T ). There could be a failure transition from a component/connector to the a
failure absorbing state depending on the severity of the failure of that component/connector. If
the there is no failure throughout the execution of the scenario, the control reaches the normal
absorbing state(the T state). The failure states in our methodology are named after the severity
associated with the failures - Minor, Marginal, Critical and Catastrophic. Now we have the
transition from a component in the control flow graph to one or more failure states depending
upon the severity of two kinds of failures, firstly failure of the component and secondly failure
of the connectors fanning out from that component. We denote the failure of the component or
the connectors fanning out of the component as a dotted line from the component to the failure
state 1.
Coming back to the steps of the methodology - we modify the transition probability
matrix P x to P x. The normal transition probability pxij between component i and j is given by:
(1− rfxi ).pxij.(1− rfxij) (3.12)
1Note: To make the risk model look better we do not draw a line for connector failures, instead we denote the
failure of this connector by drawing a dotted line from the component fanning out that connector, to the failure
state.
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The normal transition probability is the conditional probability of three factors:
• (1− rfxi ) : probability that the component i does not fail;
• pxij : probability of control transfer takes place from component i to j;
• (1− rfxij) : probability that the connector from the component i to j does not fail.
The failure transition probability of a component i is the risk factor of that component is
simply the risk factor of the component i i.e. rfxi , while the failure transition probability of the
connector between the components i and j is given by:
(1− rfxi ).pxij.(rfxij) (3.13)
The failure transition probability of a connector is the conditional probability of three
factors:
• (1− rfxi ) : probability that the component i does not fail;
• pxij : probability of control transfer takes place from components i to j;
• (rfxij) : probability that the connector from component i to j fails.
Thus the new P x will have the dimension n + m + 2, because it has n components, m
failure classes , S dummy start state and a T normal terminating state 2.
The notation that we follow in annotating the risk factors and transition probabilities is
as follows:
2Note: The sum of the all the normal and failure transition probabilities from a component i is equal to one.
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• rf scenario−namecomponent−name : risk factor of the component
• pscenario−nameconnector−name : probability of control transfer
• rf scenario−nameconnector−name : risk factor of the connector
The P x matrix can then be partitioned as follows
P x =
 Qx Cx
0 I
 (3.14)
Applying the equations for normal transition 3.12 on the example, the risk model for
the AVI scenario the failure transition probabilities for component AR(in the AVI scenario) the
normal transition probability is given by :
(1− rfAV IAR ).pAV IAR−V T .(1− rfAV IAR−V T ) (3.15)
and the failure transition probability of the component AR is rfAV IAR . The failure transition
probability that of the connector AR-VT, obtained by applying the equation 3.13 is given by:
(1− rfAV IAR ).pAV IAR−V T .(rfAV IAR−V T ) (3.16)
Since the severity associated with component AR and the connector AR − V T is the
same(Catastrophic), there is only one dotted like to represent the failure transition from the
AR representing the failures of component and connector(shown in figure 3.4. Thus the failure
transition probability along the dotted line is the the sum of both failure probabilities.
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Figure 3.4: The risk model for the AVI scenario.
The process of calculating the normal and failure transitions is repeated for all the com-
ponents and connectors in the control flow graph, which gives us the risk model for the AVI
scenario shown in figure 3.4.
The equation 3.17 shows the P matrix for the AVI scenario 3.
3Note: The sum of elements along the rows of the PAV I is equal to 1. This is because of the previously
mentioned rule that the sum of total transition probabilities from a component should be equal to 1.
CHAPTER 3. RELIABILITY-BASED RISK ANALYSIS 34
PAV I =
S
CG
AR
V T
T
FMIN
FMARG
FCRIT
FCATAS
S CG AR V T T FMIN FMARG FCRIT FCATAS
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0.4998 0.4998 0 0 0.0004 0 0
0 0 0 0.3619 0 0 0 0 0.6381
0 0 0.0472 0 0.3258 0 0 0 0.6270
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

(3.17)
3.5.3 Solving the Markov Chain
After risk model is developed for all the scenarios(for all the sequence diagrams in each scenario)
we solve inherent Markov chain of risk model. Section 3.4 already describes the procedure to
solve the Discrete Time Markov Chain(DTMC) from the risk model.
The transition probability matrix PAV I is partitioned into four sub matrices as shown in
3.18.
PAV I =
 QAV I CAV I
0 I
 (3.18)
The sub matrix QAV I has the transition probabilities from transient to transient states.
The sub matrix CAV I matrix has the transition probabilities from transient to absorbing state.
For the AVI scenario QAV I and CAV I matrices by:
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QAV I =
S
CG
AR
V T
S CG AR V T
0 1 0 0
0 0 0.4998 0.4998
0 0 0 0.3619
0 0 0.0472 0

CAV I =
S
CG
AR
V T
T FMIN FMARG FCRIT FCATAS
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0.0004 0 0
0 0 0 0 0.6381
0.3258 0 0 0 0.6270
 (3.19)
Now we calculate the conditional probability that the program control will eventually be
absorbed into one of the absorbing states given the condition that the control starts from the
start state S. For this we look into the AAV I matrix, the A matrix for the AVI scenario as
described in the section 3.4. The success and failure probability of the scenario are as follows:
1. The probability that the control is transferred to the T state is the probability that the
scenario is executed successfully.
2. Similarly the probability that the control is transferred to any of the F states : Fminor,
Fmarginal, Fcritical, Fcatastrophic is the failure probability of the AVI scenario (distributed
among the severity classes).
The sum of all the failure probabilities is equal to the total failure probability of the
scenario or the scenario risk factor. According to equation 3.20, the AAV I matrix is shown in
3.21.
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AAV I = (1−QAV I).CAV I (3.20)
(aAV IT ) is the probability that the AVI scenario is executed successfully and the factors
(aAV IFMIN ), (a
AV I
FMARG
), (aAV IFCRIT ) and (a
AV I
FCATAS
) are the failure probabilities of the AVI scenario. These
five factors correspond to the five values in the first row(because we are interested in steady state
probabilities starting from start state S) of the matrix AAV I . The AVI scenario Risk factor is
shown in the equation 3.22 4.
AAV I =
S
CG
AR
V T
T FMIN FMARG FCRIT FCATAS
0.2256 0 0.0004 0 0.7740
0.2256 0 0.0004 0 0.7740
0.1200 0 0 0 0.8800
0.3315 0 0 0 0.6685
 (3.21)
RiskAV I = (1− aAV IT )or(aAV IFminor + aAV IFmarginal + aAV IFcritical + aAV IFcatastrophic) (3.22)
Thus risk factor of the AVI scenario is equal to 1 − AAV IT = 1 − 0.2256 = 0.7744. The
important advantage of this risk assessment methodology is that the failure probability/scenario
risk factor the of the scenario is given as four factors, one for each class of severity. Since severity
plays an important role in risk assessment, this concept of the severity specific risk factor provides
vital meaning of the risk factor rather than a single number. Since the risk factor(0.7744) of the
AVI scenario is distributed as 0, 0.0004, 0 and 0.7740 corresponding to minor, marginal, critical
and catastrophic we know that most of the AVI scenario risk factor(99.94%) is catastrophic which
is more severe than the risk factor 0.9745 distributed as 0, 0.5002, 0 and 0.4743 which has lesser
catastrophic risk(only 48.67%).
4Note that (aAV IT + a
AV I
FMIN
+ aAV IFMARG + a
AV I
FCRIT
+ aAV IFCATAS ) = 1.
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3.6 Use case and System level Risk factors
This section deals with calculation of the use case risk factors and the system level risk factor.
The risk factor rfk of a use case Uk is obtained by averaging the risk factors of the the scenario
defined under that use case. Equation 3.23 shows how to obtain the use case-risk factor, where
rfxk is the risk factor of a scenario ‘x’ defined under use case ‘k’ and p
x
k is the execution probability
of that scenario.
rfk =
∑
∀Sx∈Uk
rfx.pxk (3.23)
Similarly the system level risk factor is obtained by averaging the risk factors of all the
use cases defined in the system. Equation 3.24 shows how to obtain the system-level risk factor,
where rfk is the risk factor of use case ‘k’ and pk is the execution probability of that use case.
rf =
∑
∀Uk
rfk.pk (3.24)
3.7 The Cardiac Pace Maker case study
In this section we illustrate the risk assessment methodology on the Cardiac Pacemaker system.A
cardiac pacemaker is an implanted device that assists cardiac functions when the underlying
pathologies make the intrinsic heartbeats low. An error in the software operation of the device
can cause loss of a patient’s life. This is an example of a critical real-time application. We
use the UML Real-Time notion to model the pacemaker. Figure 3.5 shows the components and
connectors of the pacemaker in the capsule diagram. The figure also shows the input/output
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Figure 3.5: The architecture of the Cardiac Pacemaker system.
port to the Heart as an external component as well as the two input ports to the Reed Switch
and the Coil Driver components. A pacemaker can be programmed to operate in one of the five
operational modes depending on which part of the heart is to be sensed and which part is to be
paced.
The main components of the cardiac pacemaker system are described below:
• ReedSwitch(RS): A magnetically activated switch that must be closed before program-
ming the device. The switch is used to avoid accidental programming by electric noise.
• CoilDriver(CD): Receives/sends pulses from/to the device programmer. These pulses are
counted and then interpreted as bit values of zero or one. These bits are then grouped into
bytes and sent to the communication gnome. Positive and negative acknowledgments, as
well as programming bits, are sent back to the programmer to confirm whether the device
has been correctly programmed and the commands are validated.
• CommunicationGnome(CG): Receives bytes from the Coil Driver, verifies these bytes as
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commands, and sends the commands to the Ventricular and Atrial models. It sends the
positive and negative acknowledgments to the Coil Driver to verify command processing.
• AtrialModel(AR) and V entricularModel(AR): These two components are similar in oper-
ation. They both could pace the heart and/or sense the heartbeats. Once the pacemaker is
programmed, the magnet is removed from the RS. The AR and VT communicate together
without further intervention. Only battery decay or some medical maintenance reasons
may force reprogramming.
3.7.1 The Use case model
The pacemaker runs in either a programming mode or in one of five operational modes. During
programming, the programmer specifies the operation mode in which the device will work. The
operation mode depends on whether the Atrial, Ventricular or both are being monitored or paced.
The programmer also specifies whether the pacing is inhibited, triggered or dual. For example
in the AVI operation mode, the Atrial portion of the heart is paced, the Ventricular portion of
the heart is sensed(monitored) and the Atrial is only paced when a Ventricular sense does not
occur (inhibited mode). The use case diagram of the pacemaker application is given in Figure
3.6. It presents the six use cases the two actors namely doctor’s programmer and patient’s heart.
Each use case in Figure 3.6 is realized by at least one sequence diagram(i.e., scenario).
Domain experts determine probabilities of occurrence of use cases and the scenarios within
each use case. This can be done in a similar fashion as the estimation of the operational profile
in the field of software reliability [29]. For the pacemaker example, it follows that inhibit modes
are more frequently used than the triggered mode [9]. Also, the programming mode is executed
significantly less frequently than the regular usage of the pacemaker in any of its operational
modes. Hence, we assume the probabilities for programming use case and five operational use
cases (AVI, AAI, AAT, VVI and VVT) as given in table 3.1. Figure 3.7 shows the sequence
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Figure 3.6: The use case model of the Cardiac Pacemaker system.
Table 3.1: The execution probability of use cases in pace maker system
Use cases Programming AVI AAI VVI AAT VVT
Probability 0.01 0.29 0.2 0.2 0.15 0.15
diagram of a scenario in the programming use case. In this use case the programmer interacts
with the RS and CD components to input a set of 8 bits specifying an operation mode for the
pacemaker. This byte is received by the CG component which in turn sets the operation mode
of the AR and VT components to one of five modes(or use cases): AVI, AAI, AAT, VVI, and
VVT. Figure 3.2 shows a scenario from the AVI use case in which the VT keeps sensing the heart
and the AR paces the heart whenever a heart beat is not sensed. As in all scenarios, a refractory
period is then in effect after every pace.
The next step is to calculate the risk factors of the components and connectors of the
system architecture defined by the the basic elements(component/connectors) of the use cases
and scenarios. More specifically in case of components we first calculate the normalized dynamic
complexity(incase of the connectors the normalized dynamic coupling). For the normalized
complexity we look into the state charts of the components under the corresponding scenario
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Figure 3.7: The programming scenario of the pacemaker system.
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Figure 3.8: The state chart of component CD in programming scenario.
Table 3.2: The normalized dynamic complexity of all components in the Programming scenario
Component DOCxi
CD 0.5
RS 0.2
CG 0.3
and come up with the McCabe’s cyclomatic complexity as described in section 3.2.1. Figure 3.8
shows the state chart of the component CD under programming scenario.
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 show the normalized complexity of the components in the Programming
and AVI scenarios of the pacemaker system.
Tables 3.4 and 3.5 show the dynamic coupling of the connectors between the various
components in the AVI scenario. For example the value along the row RS and the column CD
in table 3.4 is 0.125. This is read as dynamic coupling of the connector from RS to CD.
Then severity analysis is conducted for each component and connecter under each scenario.
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Table 3.3: The normalized dynamic complexity of all components in the AVI scenario
Component DOCxi
CG 0.00017
AR 0.60135
VT 0.34837
Table 3.4: The dynamic coupling of all connectors in the Programming scenario
RS CD CG
RS 0 0.125 0.125
CD 0 0 0.375
CG 0 0.375 0
Table 3.5: The dynamic coupling of all connectors in the AVI scenario
CG AR VT
CG 0 0.00039 0.00039
AR 0 0 0.097
VT 0 0.9 0
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Figure 3.9: The severity table of all the components in the AVI scenario.
Tables 3.9 and 3.10 show the results of the severity analysis applied to components and connectors
respectively in the AVI scenario.
The risk factors of components/connectors is the product of their dynamic complex-
ity/coupling and corresponding severities. After the risk factors all the components and connec-
tors for each scenario in the system architecture are calculated, we build the scenario risk model
as described in section 3.5.2 and estimate the risk factor of the all the scenario as a distribution
among the failure severity classes.
3.8 Sensitivity Analysis
This section describes the sensitivity analysis that can be performed with the risk factors of the
components, connectors and scenarios. The advantage with the risk assessment methodology
is that we derive closed form solutions and hence a sensitivity analysis can be performed by
changing the values of the parameters very easily. Compared to than the algorithmic approach
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Figure 3.10: The severity table of all the connectors in the AVI scenario
presented in [41] our analytical approach is simpler, faster and more effective is performing the
sensitivity analysis.
The plot in figure 3.11 shows the variation of the AVI scenario risk of the cardiac pace-
maker system as a function of the risk factors of the components CG, AR and VT. As inferred
from the graph the AVI scenario risk factor is more sensitive to the changes in risk factor of the
component VT. This can be understood from the sequence diagram of the AVI scenario shown
in figure 3.2 which shows the VT to be the most active component. We also infer that AR is also
critical since it results in the smaller value of the scenario’s risk factor - even for a highest risk
factor assumed for the component AR, the AVI scenario risk factor does not exceed 0.85. Simi-
larly, the plot 3.12 shows the sensitivity of the programming scenario of the cardiac pacemaker
system to the component risk factors. In this case the component CG is the one that causes the
largest variation in the AVI scenario risk factor(0.175 to 0.979).
We can also perform the sensitivity analysis of the system level risk factor based on the
component risk factors. Plot 3.13 shows the variations in the system level risk factor by varying
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Figure 3.11: Sensitivity of the AVI scenario risk factor to the risk factors of the components.
the risk factors of the components in the cardiac pacemaker system. We can clearly infer that
the components CG, VT and AR are the ones which mostly effect the system level risk factor.
Similar sensitivity analysis of the scenario and system risk factor can be performed for
the connectors. Plot 3.14 shows the sensitivity of AVI scenario risk factor and plot 3.15 shows
the sensitivity of the system level risk factor to the risk factors of the various connectors.
3.9 Risk factors of the Cardiac Pacemaker
The risk factors of the components/connectors, the scenarios and use cases of the cardiac pace-
maker are presented in this section. Table 3.6 shows the risk factors of the various components
in the various scenarios of the cardiac pacemaker system. The rows represent the scenarios and
the columns represent the component. A value in the riskm, n where m is the row and n is the
column gives us the risk factor of the component n in the scenario m.
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Figure 3.12: Sensitivity of the Programming scenario risk factor to the risk factors of the com-
ponents.
00.10.20.30.40.50.60.70.80.91
0.55
0.6
0.65
0.7
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
Component risk factor
Sy
st
em
 le
ve
l r
isk
 fa
ct
or
RS
CD
CG
AR
VT
Figure 3.13: Sensitivity of the System level risk factor to the risk factors of the components.
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Figure 3.14: Sensitivity of the AVI scenario risk factor to the risk factors of the connectors.
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Figure 3.15: Sensitivity of the System level risk factor to the risk factors of the connectors.
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Table 3.6: The risk factors of the components vs scenarios of the cardiac pacemaker.
RS CD CG AR VT
Programming 0.05 0.125 0.25 0 0
AVI 0 0 0.00016 0.301635 0.348365
AAI 0 0 0.00045 0.94905 0
VVI 0 0 0.00045 0 0.94905
AAT 0 0 0.00025 0.949525 0
VVT 0 0 0.00025 0 0.949525
Figure 3.16 shows a 3-D bar graph of the risk factors of the component versus the scenarios
of the pacemaker system. The graph is shaded according to the severity of the risk factors of the
components as shown in the legend. As we can see the components V T and AR are the critical
components (with darker and taller bars) across all the scenarios.
Table 3.6 shows the risk distribution of the scenarios among the four severity classes. The
rows in the table represent the scenarios and the columns represent the severity classes. A value
in the riskm, n where m is the row and n is the column gives us the risk factor of the scenario
m with the severity n. Similarly figure 3.17 shows a 3-D bar graph of the scenario risk factors
versus the four severity classes. The graph is shaded according to the distribution of the scenario
risk factors among the severity classes(as shown in the legend). As we can see the AVI scenario
has a high catastrophic risk value. The other scenarios like the AAI, VVI, AAT and VVT have
nominal marginal and catastrophic risk values.
Table 3.8 shows the distribution of the system risk factor among the four severity classes
and figure 3.18 shows the cardiac pacemaker system risk distribution among the severity classes.
As we can the the most part of the cardiac pacemaker system’s risk falls in to the catastrophic
severity class.
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Figure 3.16: The 3-D bar graph of risk factors of the components vs scenarios of the cardiac
pacemaker.
Table 3.7: The risk factors of the scenarios vs of the cardiac pacemaker.
Minor Marginal Critical Catastrophic
Programming 0.3196 0.1782 0 0
AVI 0 0.0004 0 0.774
AAI 0 0.5002 0 0.4743
VVI 0 0.5002 0 0.4743
AAT 0 0.5001 0 0.4747
VVT 0 0.5001 0 0.4747
Table 3.8: The system risk distribution of the cardiac pacemaker.
Severity Class Minor Marginal Critical Catastrophic
System Risk Factor 0.003196 0.352003 0 0.55661
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Figure 3.17: The 3-D bar graph of risk factors of the scenarios vs severity classes of the cardiac
pacemaker.
Figure 3.18: The system risk distribution of the cardiac pacemaker.
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3.10 Identification of the critical components
Identification of critical components or high-risk components in a system is an important aspect
of the development process of that system. This is because the set of most risky components
in the system should be allocated more testing efforts than those with lesser risk. A beneficial
outcome of the risk assessment methodology presented here is the ability to identify the most
critical component of the system. Figure 3.16 shows a 3-D bar graph of the risk factors of the
components, corresponding to their scenarios shaded according to their severity. This is one
way of clearly identifying the most risky components - the component with tall bars, colored
darker(as shown in the legend) in more scenarios is the most risky. Another way is to rank the
components according to their risk factors and severity. Similar analysis can also be done for
connectors which shows the risky connectors.
Chapter 4
Risk Analysis with Use case
Relationships
The risk assessment methodology presented in the chapter 3 assumes that the use cases are
independent. In this chapter we consider an extension that relaxes the assumption of indepen-
dence, i.e. it takes into account the various relationships between the use cases. We present in
particular, as a major contribution of this thesis to methodology described in our work [45], a
traversal algorithm, which scans the use case diagram as a graph. This algorithm works in two
scans of the use case diagram considering it as an undirected graph. The first pass is basically a
modified depth-first traversal, which differentiates the primitive, non-primitive and the terminal
use cases colors them accordingly. In the second pass it traverses the colored use case diagram
and depending on the coloring scheme and the information stored in the first pass, calculates the
risk factors of the non-primitive use cases. Finally the system-level risk factor is calculated by
averaging the risk factors of the terminal use cases. The algorithm is described in detail in the
section 4.1.4.
53
CHAPTER 4. RISK ANALYSIS WITH USE CASE RELATIONSHIPS 54
4.1 The various relationships between Use cases
This section is part of our risk methodology with use case relationships and is presented here for
the sake of completeness. When modelling a large complex system a large amount of information
is shown through the use case model. There will be relationships and commonalities between
the use cases. Moreover it is expected that, during the exploration of use cases the extensions
or additions to the base flow events occur as a result of interactions between the actors and the
system. As the use case model is being defined, commonality through the use cases is likely to be
discovered and shared. Possible extensions and additional behavior may also be uncovered and
defined. Some use cases will contain behaviors that are similar in many respects. To effectively
design a use case and to avoid redundant use cases there are relationships used in defining the
use case model of a system.
The base use case description provides an excellent viewpoint on the overall system be-
haviors. The addition of alternative flow descriptions and conditional logic helps to define the
variation and exception within a use case. Use case modelling provides a number of constructs
that support the clear elaboration of added complexity and detail, such as “include” and “extend”
relationships.
4.1.1 The Include relationship
The ¿extendÀ relationship models significant extensions and behaviors that can occur as ad-
ditions to the use case model as shown in figure 4.1. The actual control transfer in this kind of
extension is optional i.e. it takes place when the conditional guard is satisfied.
CHAPTER 4. RISK ANALYSIS WITH USE CASE RELATIONSHIPS 55
Figure 4.1: The Extends Relationship.
4.1.2 The Extend relationship
The¿ includeÀ relationship models encapsulated behaviors that can be inserted into a use case
and possible reused across multiple use cases as shown in figure 4.2. The included behavior(use
case) is always exercised i.e no conditional guard is checked.
4.1.3 Use case Terminology
We use the following terminology to describe different types of the use cases and the relationships
between them.
• Primitive Use case(PUC): The primitive use cases are those that do not further depend
on any other use cases. They can also be thought of as the terminal nodes of the use
case-relation tree. The risk factors of these use cases can be calculated directly without
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Figure 4.2: The Includes Relationship.
considering any relationships as described in the section 3.6 and in the paper [15].
• Non-Primitive Use case(NPUC): The non-primitive use cases are those which are depen-
dent on other use cases. They can be dependent on both primitive use cases and also other
non-primitive use cases. The risk factor for such a use case cannot be calculated directly,
because it depends on the risk factors of the use case that are related to this non-primitive
use case. The algorithm described in 4.1.4 describes how to calculate such risk factors. The
base use cases described previously is non-primitive.
• Terminal Use cases(TUC): The terminal use cases are those which are directly associated
with the actor. The terminal use cases can be both primitive or non-primitive. The risk
factors for such use cases are calculated using the algorithm described in 4.1.4.
The figure 4.3 shows an examples of the various kinds of use cases and relationships
between them. An example of the llextendsgg relationship is shown in the left part of the figure
and the llincludesgg relationship is shown in the right part of the figure.
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Figure 4.3: An example use case diagram showing the hierarchy of dependent use cases.
Considering the ¿extendsÀ relationship in the figure 4.3 we have the use case “Plan
Itinerary” associated directly with the actor A, hence this is a terminal use case(TUC). The use
case “Purchase Tickets” is extended by the “Plan Itinerary” use case hence, the “Plan Itinerary”
use case is a non-primitive use case(NPUC) and the “Purchase Tickets” use case is a primitive
use case(PUC) as it is not further related to other use cases. Now focussing on the llincludesgg
relationship we have the “Login” use case directly associated with the actor B, hence it is a
terminal use case(TUC). The use case “Authentication” is included in the use case “Login”,
hence the “Authentication” use case is a non-primitive use case and the “Login” use case is
primitive as it is not further related to any other use case.
4.1.4 The Algorithm
This section describes the algorithm to come up with the risk factors of the use cases according to
their relationships, given an annotated use case diagram. Before going into the details let us look
at how the algorithm works on the use case diagram shown in figure 4.3. In general, to deal with
the relationships we visualize the use case diagram as a graph. First we calculate the risk factors
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of the primitive use cases(such as “Purchase Tickets” and the “Authentication” use cases) and
then aggregate these risk factors into the non-primitive use cases(such as “Plan Itinerary” and
“Login” use cases) that are directly related to the primitive use cases. This process is repeated
until we estimate risk factors of all the terminal use cases(the “Plan Itinerary” and “Login” use
cases). After that calculate the system-level risk factor by averaging the risk factors of the TUC
with the corresponding execution probabilities. The process of calculating the risk factor for a
primitive use case(C) is based on the methodology presented in the section our previous work
[15].
Risk factor aggregations are done depending upon the relationships between the use cases
and the amount of detail about the use cases. In the case of ¿includesÀ relationship the
probability P (i.e the probability that the PUC will be executed in the DTMC of NPUC) is equal
to one and incase of¿extendsÀ relationship the P is equal to the execution probability assigned
to that PUC.
For the example use case diagram in 4.3 the risk factor calculated from the DTMC of the
“Authentication” use case, its risk factor in are incorporated into the DTMC of the “Login” use
case always i.e. with P = 1 as the relationship is llincludesgg. In case of the “Purchase Tickets”
use case , its risk factor is included in the “Plan Itinerary” use case with a probability 0 < P < 1,
which is is equal to the execution probability o“Purchase Tickets” use case as specified, because
the relation ship between use cases A and B is ¿extendsÀ. Finally we average the risk factors
of use cases A and C with the system-level execution probabilities(as specified), to come up with
the system-level risk factor.
This process might look simple for the examples presented in the figure 4.3 but in practise
the use case diagrams are huge and complex. Hence we realized the need for a general algorithm
which scans the use case diagram, identifies the use cases according the relationships between
them, identifies the hierarchy and then aggregates the risk factors of the use cases according to
the relationships.
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The algorithm presented here needs a properly annotated use case diagram(graph) as
input. Annotations of the use case include - proper nomenclature of the actors and the use cases
and the probabilities across the arcs for the relationships between the use cases. The following
algorithm works in two passes(or scans) for a given use case diagram. In the first pass the
algorithm traverses the use case diagram using a depth-first priority. The main outcome of the
first scan is to identify and color the use cases according to the relationships and hierarchy. This
helps in the risk aggregations during the second pass. There could be special use cases.
By the end of the first pass/scan we have the use cases(nodes) of use case diagram(graph)
colored with four colors - red for actors, white for primitive use cases, black for non-primitive
use cases and gray for use cases that are associated directly with the actors. There are also
combinations of two colors: such as (gray + black) or (gray + white) if a particular use case
satisfies the criteria for both the conditions. We also build the Successor RiskMatrix[] list for
each node in the graph, which has the same dimension as the Adjacent[] matrix, that stores the
risk factors of the all the child nodes of each node as soon as they are calculated. By the end
of first pass we also calculate the risk factors of the primitive use cases and their corresponding
entries in the Successor RiskMatrix[] of the parent nodes. 1
In the second pass of the algorithm we scan the colored use case diagram - we start from
an actor, and then look into the Successor RiskMatrix[] of each node. If all the values in this
matrix are calculated(i.e. no value in the matrix is -1) then we directly calculate the risk factor
of that node by calling the Risk-Factor() routine, otherwise we proceed in the direction of the
node which has a -1 entry in its parent/predecessor Successor RiskMatrix[] and look into its
Successor RiskMatrix[] recursively. This process is repeated until the Successor RiskMatrix[] of
the all gray colored nodes are calculated. Finally the System-Risk() routine is called, which
calculates the system risk factor.
The risk assessment algorithm is described as follows [5]:
1Initially all the entries of the Successor RiskMatrix[] for each node are initialized to -1
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Main()
Initialize all the Succcesor RiskMatrix[] of the all nodes to -1;
The Succcesor RiskMatrix[] of each node is of the same dimension as the Adjacent[] matrix
of that node and it stores the risk factors of the child nodes(corresponding to the child of the
Adjacent[] matrix) or -1 in case the risk factor of the child node is not calculated. -1 is used
because it is an invalid risk factor which acts as an indicator that the risk factor of a particular
node is not calculated yet
Initialize Risk Factor value of all nodes to -1;
-1 is used for the same reason and the Risk Factor(node) stores the risk factor of the
node
First-Pass();
In the first pass all the nodes of the use case diagram are traversed and each node is colored
according to the coloring scheme. Also by the end of the first pass risk factors of all the primitive
nodes is calculated and stored in the corresponding places in the Succesor RiskMatrix[].
Reset Adjacent[] matrices of all the nodes as they have been decremented in
the first pass;
Second-Pass();
In the second pass, the risk factors of all the non-primitive nodes are calculated after which
the system-level risk factor are calculated
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End Main();
First-Pass()
1. For each a ∈ Actors[]
For each actor in the use case diagram
(a) color(a)=red;
Color the actor red
(b) Predecessor[a]=Nill;
Set its predecessor value to Null
(c) Direct-Actor(a);
Call the routine Direct-Actor with the corresponding actor as the parameter
(d) Actors[]=Actors[]- a;
Remove that actor from Actors[]so that it the traversal does not start from that actor
again
2. Return
3. End First-Pass()
Direct-Actor(a)
1. For each u ∈ Adjacent[a]
For each node directly connected to the actor a
(a) color(u)=gray;
Color it gray
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(b) Predecessor[u]=a;
Set its predecessor value to the related actor
(c) Adjacent[a] = Adjacent[a] - u;
Remove that node from the Adjacent[] matrix
(d) DFS-Visit(u);
Repeat these steps until all the nodes connected to that actor are traversed
2. Return
3. End Direct-Actor()
DFS-Visit(u)
1. If(color(u)==red) return;
If we reach the actor which is colored red then return
2. If(Adjacent[u] is not null)
While the Adjacent[] of the node u is not null
(a) For each v ∈ Adjacent[u]
For each such node
i. If color(v)==nil Predecessor[v]=u ; color(v)=black;
Color it black for mark it as non-primitive node
ii. If(color(v)==gray Predecessor[v]=u; color[v]=black + gray;
Color it(black + gray) to mark it as non-primitive node if it is already gray
iii. Adjacent[u]=Adjacent[u] - v;
Remove that node from the Adjacent[] so that we do not go back in that direction
iv. DFS-Visit(v);
Recursive call of the routine with node v as parameter
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3. Else
If there are no more child nodes
(a) If(color(u)==gray color(u)=white + gray;
Color that node white + gray is already gray
(b) Else color(u])=white;
(c) Calculate the primitive use case risk factor and store it in Risk Factor[u];
(d) Successor RiskMatrix[predecessor(u)]= Risk Factor(u);
Store it in the Successor RiskMatrix of the parent
(e) DFS-Visit(predecessor[u]);
Go a the parent of the node u and traverse along the other nodes
4. Return;
5. End DFS-Visit()
Second-Pass()
1. For each u ∈ Adjacent[color(node)==red]
For each node u directly connected to the actor in the use case diagram
2. DFS-Scan(u);
Call the routine DFS-Scan with parameter u
3. System-Risk();
Call the system risk factor
4. Return;
5. End Second-Pass();
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DFS-Scan(u)
Does a depth first scan each time for the node whose risk factor is not calculated
1. If(color(u)==red) return;
If we reach the actor which is colored red then return
2. If(Risk Factor(u)==-1)
If the risk factor of the use case is not calculated yet
(a) For x ∈ Successor RiskMatrix[](u)==-1
For each nodal entry ’x’==-1 in the Successor RiskMatrix of node u
(b) DFS-Scan(x);
Initiate a recursive DFS-Scan with that node as parameter
3. Else
(a) Risk-Factor(u);
Call the routine Risk-Factor with node u as parameter
(b) DFS-Scan(predecessor(u));
Call the routine recursively with parent of node u
4. Return;
5. End DFS-Scan()
Risk-Factor(u)
1. Read the probabilities of all the arcs along the nodes Adjacent[u];
Remember all the Adjacent nodes have been reset before second pass
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2. Read the values of the Successor RiskMatrix[](u);
3. Build/solve the Markov chain with u as the start node and considering only
those nodes directly connected to u;
4. Successor RiskMatrix [predecessor(u)]= Risk Factor(u);
5. Return;
6. End Risk-Factor(u);
System-Risk()
1. For all the(gray + white) and(gray + black) colored nodes calculate the product
of execution probability and the risk factor;
2. System Risk Factor = Sum(products);
3. Return;
4. End System-Risk()
4.2 A Motivating case study
The case study we use to illustrate our work is a large command and control system that is a real
time system used in a life-critical, mission-critical application. The modelling of the system was
performed using Rational Rose Realtime case tool. We will concentrate on the Thermal Control
part of the system, which has a hierarchical architecture.
Figure 4.4 shows the use case diagram and all the relationships among the use cases
and the actors. It is a rather complex system with operations setting controller, fault recovery
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procedures and pump control functionalities. The system is responsible for providing overall
management of pumps as well as performing the necessary monitoring and response to sensors
data. Also, it is responsible for performing automated startup and controlling thermal system
reconfigurations.
During each execution cycle, a check is performed for incoming commands. Received
commands are validated in the same execution cycle. Mode change commands, which will recon-
figure the internal thermal system are also accepted from other components of thermal system
to compensate for system component failures or coolant leaks. A failure recovery system detects
failure conditions and performs recovery operations in response to the detected failures. Failure
conditions include combinations of pump failures and shutoff-valve failures.
4.2.1 Scenario Risk Factors
We use an analytical modelling approach to derive the risk factor of each scenario. For this
purpose we generalize the state-based modelling approach previously used for architecture-based
software reliability estimation [14] in chapter 3. In the scenario risk model we account for both
component and connector failures, that is, consider both component and connector risk factors.
In addition, instead of a single failure state for the scenario, we consider multiple failure states
that represent failure modes with different severity.
This approach allows us to derive not only the overall scenario risk factor, but also its
distribution over different severity classes, which provides additional insights important for risk
analysis. For example, two scenarios may have close values of scenarios risk factors with signif-
icantly different distributions among severity classes. It can then be inferred that the scenario
with a risk factor distributed among more severe failure classes (e.g., critical and catastrophic),
deserves more attention than the other scenario. The scenario risk model is developed in two
steps as described in sections 3.5.1 and 3.5.2.
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Figure 4.4: The Use case diagram of Thermal Control.
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Figure 4.5: The Risk model for Both Pump Retry scenario.
Applying the methodology described in [15] the risk factor of the Both Pumps Retry
scenario is calculated to be 0.76. This risk factor is distributed among Marginal, Critical and
Catastrophic severity classes as 0.11, 0.0703 and 0.5802 respectively. The figure 4.5 shows the
risk model built for the bothpumpretry scenario shown the use case diagram 4.4.
4.2.2 Use case Risk Factors
To calculate the risk factors of the use cases according to the relationships between them we
apply the algorithm described in section 4.1.4 on the use case diagram shown in figure 4.4. In
this case study we are considering only the ¿extendÀ relationship(shown in figure 4.4). As per
the algorithm the risk factors of primitive use cases - the Setting use cases(Setting1,Setting2...)
and the Pump Retry use cases(Pump1 Retry,Pump2 Retry...) are calculated first. Then the
DTMCs for the Failure Recovery and Mode Setting use cases are built by incorporating the
extended use cases. Since the Failure Recovery use case is extended further by the Monitoring
use case, the DTMC of the Monitoring use case incorporates Failure Recovery. From the domain
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Figure 4.6: The DTMC for the Monitoring use case.
knowledge, we know that the Failure Recovery use case is extended with probability of 0.01.
Thus the DTMC for the monitoring use case is is generated accordingly, as shown in figure 4.6.
Finally the risk factors of the terminal use cases Failure Recovery and Monitoring are
averaged with the execution probabilities 0.05 and 0.95 respectively to obtain the system-level
risk factor. Figure 4.7 shows a 3-D bar graph of the distribution of risk factors of various use
cases ‘extended’ by the Failure Recovery use cases.
Figure 4.8 shows a similar graph for the various use cases ‘extended’ by the Mode Setting
use case. The bars are colored according to the severity of the risk factors. A taller and darker
bar represents a risk value with high severity. As shown in the figure the much of the risk factors
of the primitive use cases of the non-primitive Mode Setting use case fall into the catastrophic
severity range. Moreover the risk factors values of the use cases are higher than those of the
Failure Recovery use case. It can be clearly inferred that the use cases need thorough revision
and more testing efforts.
In figure 4.9, the risk factors of the monitoring and mode setting use cases are presented.
The bars represent the total risk factors of the use cases along with the distribution of risk factors
among the severity factors. Monitoring use case is clearly the riskier than mode setting. This is
because the execution probability of the Monitoring use case is high. Had we not considered this
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Figure 4.7: The risk distribution of the use cases for the Failure Recovery use case.
Figure 4.8: The risk distribution of the use cases for the Mode Setting use case.
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Figure 4.9: The DTMC for the Monitoring use case.
relation ships between the use cases this difference between the use cases could not have been
accurate. Moreover the Monitoring use case risk factors fall more into the catastrophic severity
class. Hence more attention should be given to the development and testing of monitoring use
case as it is a potential source of errors.
Chapter 5
Performance-Based Risk Analysis
This chapter presents performance-based risk analysis. The analysis presented here is also at
an architectural-level and based on UML specifications. Performance is a non-functional soft-
ware attribute that plays an important role in application domains ranging from safety-critical
system to e-commerce applications. We introduce the concept of performance-based risk as a
risk resulting from the failure of scenarios to meet the specified performance requirements. In
particular we are interested in performance attributes such as response time and throughput.
Performance-based risk is defined as a combination of the probability to violate a performance
objective/requirement and the severity of that violation.
We define performance failure as an unexpected performance result originated from the
violation of a non-functional requirement(or objective). Since performance requirements are
usually expressed in terms of time, a requirement violation is said to occur when a certain
operation takes too long to be completed. This type of failure follows faults that concern system
performance rather than system functionalities. For example, the extra time taken from an
operation to complete may have been spent in a device that has been saturated due to the system
heavy workload. Thus, even though the software system is functionally correct, it may suffer
72
CHAPTER 5. PERFORMANCE-BASED RISK ANALYSIS 73
from performance failures. In some cases with this kind of failure may have worse consequences
than functional failures. The performance-based risk analysis is based on annotations of the
UML diagrams that support such analysis. The methodology derives the software and hardware
parameters from the annotated UML sequence diagrams and deployment diagrams and provides
the values for performance-risk for a specified workload.
5.1 Overview of the proposed methodology
In this section we introduce an approach to estimate the performance-risk factor based on failures
of a software system modelled with UML diagrams. The methodology mainly identifies risk
based on performance requirements that are time-related(e.g. the completion time of a specific
operation must be less than a certain threshold). We consider performance failures due to
a extended completion time of a certain operation(or if the response time requirement of a
particular scenario is not met),for a specifies workload. An operation, i.e. a sequence of actions
that a software system performs in order to react to an external trigger, can be described as a
UML Sequence Diagram. Therefore our observation point to estimate the probability of a specific
performance failure is limited to a sequence diagram. Given the input as annotated UML use
case diagrams, sequence diagrams, deployment diagrams and performance objectives for each of
scenario we come up with the risk of performance failure of that scenario based for a range of
workloads.
The main contribution of this thesis to the performance-risk analysis methodology, pre-
sented in [5] are the steps 3 and 5. All the other steps have been described shortly for the sake of
completeness.
The input to our methodology and its steps of are described as follows [5]:
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INPUT: Annotated UML diagrams which include Use case diagram, sequence diagrams
and deployment diagram; Performance objectives of scenarios(described by sequence diagrams)
1. For each scenario in each use case and for each scenario is that use case;
(a) STEP 1 - Assign demand vector to each “action” in sequence diagram and build a
Software Execution Model for that scenario
(b) STEP 2 - Add hardware platform characteristics on the deployment diagram and
conduct stand-alone analysis
(c) STEP 3 - Devise the workload parameters; build a System Execution Model and
conduct contention-based analysis and estimate probability of performance failure
(d) STEP 4 - Conduct severity analysis and estimate severity of performance failure for
the scenario
(e) STEP 5 - Estimate the performance risk of the scenario; Identify high-risk components
In order to estimate the probability of such a performance failure, we build a model
taking into account the sum of completion times of all the actions performed in the scenario.
The estimation of the completion time of an operation not only depends on combination of these
individual action times, but also the resource contention based on system workload. Thus the
response time of a given scenario depends on both the action completion times and the system
workload.
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Figure 5.1: The annotated sequence diagram.
5.2 Step 1: Assign demand vector to each “action” in
Sequence Diagram and build a Software Execution
Model
Figure 5.1 shows the the a sequence diagram, annotated with information related to the resources
that each action/interaction needs, in order to be completed. These extensions of UML to
represent performance-related concepts have been described in [43] and recently accepted by
OMG as a UML profile.
CHAPTER 5. PERFORMANCE-BASED RISK ANALYSIS 76
5.2.1 Annotations of the UML Sequence Diagrams
Figure 5.1 shows the annotations that we used in our methodology. We used two kinds of pa-
rameters to annotate the account for steps of components and connectors in a sequence diagram.
There are again two parameters defined for each action/step of a component, first CPUinstr, the
number of CPU instructions required to perform this action and second DISKdata, the number
for bytes that are read or written to disk to perform this action. The action/step of connector
is identified by one parameter Interaction which would contain the size of data that is being
transferred across that connector.
The second part of this step translates the sequence diagram(SD) dynamics into a Flow-
Graph. After the execution graph is parameterized with demand vectors, it becomes a Execution
Graph(EG). This is called the Software Execution Model [36]. Step 2 describes how the Software
Execution Model converted System Execution Model by mapping the hardware characteristics
described by a deployment diagram.
Similar ideas translation of SD patterns into EG patterns have been given in [37]. A more
extensive approach has been introduced in [7], where also asynchronous communication patterns
and concurrent action executions have been considered.
5.3 Step 2: Add hardware platform characteristics on the
Deployment Diagram; Conduct stand-alone analysis
In order to translate a demand vector in elapsed time, we need to know characteristics of the
hardware platform where the software application will be executed. For example, the same
number of CPU basic instructions may take, different times depending on the CPU speed or the
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Figure 5.2: The annotated deployment diagram.
same number of disk operations(read/write) may vary depending upon disk speed. In this step
we get hardware platform information from an annotated deployment diagram. The advantage
of a deployment diagram is that it visually ties the various software components of the system
to the hardware components they are executing on.
Figure 5.2 shows an annotated deployment diagram of a hardware platform. Each deploy-
ment site can be annotated with the number and type of resources that it hosts. The annotated
deployment diagram in figure 5.2 shows two servers, A and B connected by a LAN and the clients
A, B and C connected to the servers via a WAN. The site stereotype gives the set of devices
allocated on it. Server-A uses a processor of type CPU-1, Server-B uses a processor of type
CPU-1, and in addition uses a disk of type Disk-1. Similarly, client A uses a processor of type
CPU-2, and clients B and C each use a processor of type CPU-3.
The demand vectors of the software execution model and mapped to the service times
of the corresponding hardware and the service demands for each step of the sequence diagram
are calculated. Then based on the software execution graph of the scenario, we calculate the
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sum of demands (D) for that scenario. While calculating the completion time of a scenario with
branching, we consider those branch/path, which have higher service demands and ignore others
(this is clearly explained on the case study in section 5.7).
A stand-alone analysis of such a system consists in evaluating the completion time of the
whole SD as it would be executed on a dedicate hardware platform with a single user workload.
This is an optimistic estimation since it does not consider delays due to contention for resources.
Therefore, if the time value from stand-alone analysis violates the performance requirement
the failure probability can be considered equal to 1 without any further investigation, and the
software system has no feasible implementation under the given set of requirements. Otherwise,
it is worth to investigate the system behavior while varying its workload, in order to estimate
the failure probability.
5.4 Step 3: Devise the workload parameters;build System
Execution Model; conduct contention-based analysis
and estimate probability of performance failure
For building the System Execution Model and estimating the probability of performance failure
we use the bounding analysis on response time. With bounding analysis it takes very little com-
putation to determine the response time as a function of system workload intensity(population,
arrival rate etc.).
There are many advantages of bounding analysis few of which can be listed as follows
[25]:
1. The results of these techniques provides a balanced insight into the primary factors affecting
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the system performance. The influence of system bottleneck is highlighted and quantified
2. These bounds can be computed simply and quickly (even by hand) and can be used as first
cut modelling to eliminate alternatives at an early stage of software life cycle.
3. Bounding analysis can also be used to estimate the potential performance gain of alterna-
tives to existing system.
There are also two types of performance bounds: asymptotic and balanced system bounds.
We are interested in asymptotic bounds, which are simpler to estimate, although balances system
bounds tend to be more accurate. In order to be able to build System Execution Model and
conduct contention-based analysis we first need to define the system workload in one of the
following terms: the arrival rate λ (for transaction workloads), or the population N(for batch
workloads) or the population N and think time Z(for terminal workloads). In our case we consider
batch workloads so the think time is zero.
A complete system contention-based analysis lays on the parametrization of a System
Execution Model with values coming from the synthesis of the Software Execution Model mapped
via a deployment diagram. The parameterized model can then be solved to obtain performance
indices. We are interested in estimating the optimistic(lower) and pessimistic(upper) bounds
on system throughput and response time for a given scenario rather than actually solving the
performance model. The equations defining the asymptotic bounds on the throughput and
response time of a system with batch workload, as a function of number of customers N are
given as follows [25]:
Bounds on Throughput: 1/D ≤ X(N) ≤ min(N/D, 1/Dmax)
Bounds on Response Time: max(D,N ∗Dmax) ≤ R(N) ≤ N ∗D
where N is the number of customers, D =
∑
Di is the sum of all demands in the scenario
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Figure 5.3: The plot showing the asymptotic bounds and failure probability estimates for response
time.
and Dmax is the maximum demand in that scenario.
Figure 5.3 shows a diagram of the asymptotic bounds on response time R(N) versus the
workload N (no. of customers). The upper bound N ∗D is shown as the line marked with (-o-)
The lower bound is estimated by comparing D, shown as line marked with (-+-) and N ∗Dmax,
shown as a line marked with (-*-). The values of the actual response time must lie between these
three lines. Figure 5.3 shows the a 6 seconds response time objective(parallel to x-axis) and the
assumed workload of 7 customers(parallel to y-axis).
1. Z1: Failure probability (Z1) = 0.
2. Z2: Failure probability (Z2) = (UB −OBJ)/(UB − LB)
3. Z3: Failure probability (Z3) = 1
Note: UB stands for Upper Bound, LB for Lower Bound and OBJ stands for Performance
Objective.
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In order to estimate the probability of a performance failure, we partition the workload
domain in three zones. In the Z1 zone both upper and lower bound on the response time are
below the performance objective, so the probability of failure is zero. Analogously the failure
probability holds 1 in the Z3 zone, as both bounds fall over the performance objective. In the
Z2 zone we estimate the failure probability as the ratio between the distance of the upper bound
from the performance objective (failure range) and the distance between the bounds (whole
range).
5.5 Step 4: Conduct severity analysis and estimate sever-
ity of performance failure for the scenario
Severity analysis is performed using Functional Failure Analysis (FFA), based on UML use case
Diagrams. FFA is performed on system-level sequence diagrams. This provides a comprehensive
view of the ways in which the system can fail, and the severity of the failure. The results of
FFA study are recorded in a tabular form. A framework of the severity analysis to come up with
the severity values of the scenarios based on performance failures is presented in out previous
work [17]. The system-level sequence diagrams show the system states, the actors involved,
and the input and output events. Note that the system-level sequence diagram of a scenario is
different from the component/connector-interaction sequence diagram. The Internal components
and their interactions are not shown in the system-level sequence diagram. The details of coming
with the severity values for various scenarios is presented in [5] as is not presented here as it is
not a contribution of this thesis.
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5.6 Step 5: Estimate the performance risk of the scenario
and identify high-risk components
The performance risk of a scenario is defined as the product of two factors:
1. Probability of performance-failure : The probability that the system will fail to meet the
required performance objective obtained from STEP 3 5.4
2. Severity of performance-failure : The severity associated with this performance failure of
the system in this scenario obtained from STEP 4 5.5.
In addition to estimating performance risk of a scenario (i.e., identifying high-risk scenar-
ios), our methodology also helps in identifying a set of high-risk components that should undergo
more rigorous development and implementation and to which should be allocated more testing
effort. For this purpose, we first estimate the overall residence time of each component in a given
scenario and then normalizing it with the response time of the scenario.
A high-risk component is said to be the one with a higher normalized service time in a
certain scenario. In a case of a performance failure in a certain scenario, the component, with a
high service time, will be the bottleneck component causing that failure. Moreover a component
can be compared across many scenarios and if the service demand for that component in high
across many scenarios then that component is certainly critical.
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Figure 5.4: The Use case model of the E-commerce case study.
5.7 E-commerce case study
The steps 3 and 5 are the main contributions of this thesis .The application of these steps is
explained in detail, while the application of steps 1, 2 and 4 are described shortly for the sake of
completeness. For details on applying the steps 1,2 and 4 on the e-commerce case study please
refer [5]
In order to validate our risk assessment methodology, we applied it to an e-commerce
application. Performance is important for these types of systems, since a slow response may
result in the loss of an impatient customer etc. A e-commerce system is a widely used, web-
based application, which allows customers and suppliers to interact with each other over the
internet through software agents. Briefly describing, the system allows a customer to browse
through the various catalogs provided by the suppliers, select the item to be purchased and place
the order. The order is validated by checking two things: if the customer has a contract with
the supplier; and a bank account/s through which payments can be made. The supplier checks
for the availability of the product and if available, ships the product. On receiving the product,
the customer sends back an acknowledgement. Finally, the invoice is processed by electronically
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Figure 5.5: The Scenario diagram for Place Requisition scenario.
transferring funds from the customer’s bank account to the supplier’s. Details of the system are
presented in [13].
Figure 5.4 shows the use case model of the e-commerce case study. It consists of six use
cases, which are explained in detail in [13]. The Sequence Diagram for place requisition scenario
shown in figure 5.5. Applying step 1 on the scenario diagram we, transform it into the Execution
Graph shown in figure 5.6. Each rectangle in figure 5.6 is a node representing a process step
and the first node(PLACE REQ) denotes an expanded node. Note that the time taken for the
execution of the whole scenario is NOT the sum of time taken by each individual branch, rather,
it is the time taken by a single branch or path which takes the longest time when compared to
the time taken by the other concurrent branches. We consider only this path for calculating the
sum of demands for that scenario. In figure 5.6, the path with the highest demand is shown in
bold and it forms the process sequence that takes the longest time and has the highest demand.
For details please refer [5].
CHAPTER 5. PERFORMANCE-BASED RISK ANALYSIS 85
Figure 5.6: The Software Execution Graph of the Place Requisition Scenario.
Figure 5.7: The deployment diagram of the E-commerce application.
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Table 5.1: The service times of hardware devices
CPU1 CPU3 CPU4 DISK3 DISK4 LAN WAN Local
Units loc/ns loc/ns loc/ns µsec/KB µsec/KB µsec/KB µsec/KB µsec/KB
Service times 40 10 5 120 60 80 800 5
Figure 5.7 shows the deployment diagram with hardware platform characteristics. Based
on the annotations in the deployment diagram we build the service times of the hardware plat-
form devices. There are there CPUs, two Disks, a local area network(LAN) and a wide area
network(WAN) identified from the deployment diagram, whose service times are shown in table
5.1. Table 5.2 shows the demand vectors of each step in the place requisition scenario. These
are then multiplied with the corresponding values in the table 5.1 to get the values for the sys-
tem execution model. In the case of the place requisition scenario, the sum of demands (or
the completion time of scenario) is equal to 0.7408. For a stand-alone analysis of this scenario
(considering the workload of single customer), the performance objective of 6 seconds is well
met. Hence we move on to the contention-based analysis and estimate probability of failure for
a range of workloads as shown in figure 5.8.
The system execution model for each scenario is built after they pass the stand-alone
analysis. Similarly the values of the maximum demand Dmax and sum of all the demands D is
also calculated for all the scenarios. The values for place requisition scenario are Dmax=0.328
and D=0.7408. We are interested in the risk factor of the scenario with a desired response time
of 6 seconds at a workload of 15 customers. Figure 5.8 shows the plot of the asymptotic bounds
on the response time on a varying workload for place requisition scenario. All the parameters
are labelled in the plot and the values are as follows : The upper and lower bounds for a
workload of 15 customers are 11.1120 and 4.9200 respectively and the performance objective for
this scenario is 6 seconds. The probability of the performance failure for the scenario is equal to
(UB −OBJ)/(UB − LB) = (11.112− 6)/(11.112− 4.92) = 0.8256.
From the severity analysis described in section 5.5 the severity for the performance failure
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Table 5.2: The demand vectors of the Place Requisition scenario
Processing Step CPU1 CPU3 CPU4 DISK3 DISK4 LAN WAN Local
job job job byte byte byte byte byte
CI1 1 80
RA1 6 240
CTS1 2.699 1000 1000
RA2 4 160
OFS1 5.699 1000 10
RA3 6 1000
RS1 2 1000
RA4 2 10
CA4 5 240
DOA1 3 1000
OS1 2 1000
CA5 2 10
CI3 3 1000
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Figure 5.8: The plot showing the asymptotic bounds for response time of place requisition
scenario.
of place requisition scenario is catastrophic with associated value 0.95. Hence the risk factor of
this scenario is product of both 0.8256 and 0.95 which equals 0.7843.
Table 5.3 shows the probability and severity of performance failures of all the scenarios
of the e-commerce case study, along with their risk factors. The place requisition and confirm
shipment scenario present high catastrophic risk values and hence need more design and testing
efforts. Its worth while to investigate the components in these scenarios.
Figure 5.9 shows the performance-risk factors of the various scenarios in the e-commerce
system. The bars are colored according to the four classes of severity. Higher and darker bars
are scenarios with high risk factors. In the figure the place requisition scenario and the confirm
shipment scenarios are the ones with high risk factors, falling into the catastrophic severity class.
The result of the last step in the methodology i.e identification of the performance-critical
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Table 5.3: The performance requirements and the risk factors of the various scenarios in the
e-commerce case study
Scenario Desired Workload Prob. Severity Risk Factor
response time of failure of failure
Browse Catalog 4 4 0.0 0.25 0.0
Place Requisition 6 15 0.8256 0.95 0.7843
Process Delivery order 6 6 0.76 0.5 0.38
Confirm Shipment 6 7 0.7619 0.95 0.7238
Confirm Delivery 2 5 0.9158 0.75 0.6869
Send Invoice 4 7 0.6903 0.75 0.5177
components is shown in Figure 5.10. The components are shown in x-axis the scenarios are
shown on y-axis and the normalized-service times of components are shown on z-axis. To obtain
these values the sum of service times of the various action-steps of a component in a scenario is
normalized against the sum of action-steps of all components in that scenario as shown in section
5.6. It can seen that many components in the confirm shipment and place requisition scenarios
have high service demands and moreover the severity assigned to these scenarios is catastrophic,
hence these components are the performance-critical and need more investigation. There is also
a component in the browse catalog scenario which has a very high service demand value but
since the severity assigned to this scenario is only minor this component can be considered as
less critical.
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Figure 5.9: The graph showing the performance-risk factor of the various scenarios of e-commerce
system.
Figure 5.10: The graph showing the performance-critical components of the e-commerce system.
Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future Work
This thesis presents the architectural-level methodologies focussed on assessment of reliability-
bjiased and performance-based risk. The reliability-based risk is defined as the product of prob-
ability of failure and the severity of the failure. A methodology for calculating the risk factors of
various components and connectors and building a risk model from a sequence diagram is pre-
sented in chapter 3. This methodology calculates the distribution of scenario risk factor, among
the various severity classes by solving the Markov chain of the risk model. Then it aggregates the
risk factors of scenarios to give the use case risk factors. The system-level risk factor is calculated
by averaging the use case risk factors with their execution probabilities. The risk methodology
is applied on the cardiac pacemaker case study in section 3.7. Since the methodology is en-
tirely analytical and provides a closed form solution, it is very suitable for sensitivity analysis
and automation. In fact, a prototype of the risk assessment tool written in JAVA which reads
the embedded UML information from Rational Rose, and calculates the various risk factors has
already been developed.
An extension to this methodology, which relaxes the assumption of independent use cases
i.e considers the various relationships between the use cases is presented in chapter 4. The
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algorithm for automation of the risk aggregations process, presented in section 4.1.4 works in
two passes. In the first pass the algorithm scans the entire use case diagram in a depth-first
manner and colors the use cases according to the relationships. It colors the primitive, non-
primitive and the terminal usecases each with a different color and also calculates the primitive
use case risk factors. In the second pass the algorithm works in a bottom-up fashion. It uses
the coloring scheme, checks if risk factors of all the use cases directly related to a non-primitive
use case are calculated and then calculates the risk factor of that non-primitive use case. This is
repeated until all the non-primitive and the terminal use case risk factors are calculated. Finally
the algorithm computes the system-level risk factor based in the specified execution probabilities
of the terminal use cases. This algorithm is applied on the HCS case study in section 4.2. As
part of the future work this algorithm should be integrated in the risk assessment tool.
In performance-based risk analysis presented in the chapter 5 defines performance-risk as
the product of the probability of a performance failure and the severity of the performance failure.
The performance failures of the each scenario is analyzed by building a software execution model
of that scenario with the demand vectors. The software execution is converted to a system
execution model based in the deployment diagram information about the hardware platform.
A stand alone analysis is conducted for each scenario and the if the scenario passes the stand
alone performance requirements a contention-based analysis is conducted, using the asymptotic
bounding analysis. This kind of analysis is conducted at a scenario level and the risk factors are
calculated from the bounds on the response time for a suitable workload for that scenario. As part
of the future work for performance-based risk analysis we are looking at bounds on throughput
for the scenarios along with the response time. A balanced system bounding analysis can also
be conducted, which provides a higher accuracy than the asymptotic bounds.
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